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Cover photo: A U.S. Soldier provides
security during a coordinated,
independent patrol along the
demarcation line near a village
outside Manbij, Syria, June 26, 2018.
The U.S. recently started conducting
these patrols with Turkish Military
Forces, patrolling on opposite sides
of the demarcation line. (U.S. Army
photo by SSG Timothy R. Koster).
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CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. POLICY

U.S. soldiers drive their tactical vehicle through a blockade created to keep unwanted
military vehicles off the road leading toward Manbij, Syria, June 26, 2018. U.S. and Turkish
militaries recently began performing reassurance patrols along the demarcation line
separating the areas of the country controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces and the
Syrian Regime Forces. (U.S. Army photo by SSG Timothy R. Koster).

Introduction

S

Y RI A has become one of the most
vexing and complex problems for U.S.
strategic planners in recent times.
Currently, the United States has about
2,000 troops in the northeastern part of the
country whose primary mission has been
to aid the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF),
made up primarily of Kurds and some
Arab tribesmen, to fight ISIS. The near
total defeat of ISIS in Syria, especially with
the fall of its so-called caliphate capital

in Raqqa in October 2017, might seem to
suggest that the military mission is coming
to an end and, therefore, the United States
should pull out its troops. Indeed, President
Donald Trump stated publicly in late March
2018, that he wanted these troops to come
home “very soon.” 1 However, since that
time, the U.S. President has backtracked
from this statement after receiving advice
from several of his top military advisers,
including Defense Secretary James
Mattis,2 some foreign leaders like French
President Emanuel Macron 3 and Israeli

1 Alexandra Wilts, “Donald Trump says US will withdraw from Syria ‘very soon’—despite promise not to telegraph
military thinking,” The Independent, March 29, 2018. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/
donald-trump-us-withdrawal-syria-very-soon-other-people-isis-a8280706.html
2 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “Trump Drops Push for Immediate Withdrawal of Troops from Syria,” New York Times, April
4, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/world/middleeast/trump-syria-troops.html
3 “Macron says persuaded Trump to keep troops in Syria,” The Daily Star, April 16, 2018. http://www.dailystar.com.
lb/News/Middle-East/2018/Apr-16/445409-macron-says-persuaded-trump-to-keep-troops-in-syria.ashx
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A local man and little girl watch from his house as U.S. soldiers conduct a patrol through his
village along the demarcation line outside Manbij, Syria, July 14, 2018. (U.S. Army photo by
SSG Timothy R. Koster).
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and
influential members of Congress, such as
Senator Lindsey Graham, all of whom have
recommended that the President keep
these troops in Syria.
The key questions are: What should the
mission of these troops be now that ISIS is
on its last legs and how long should they
remain in Syria? Outside of the strictly
military dimension, what purpose does and
should these troops serve? Can the presence
of these troops help foster U.S. leverage
in Syria that would serve U.S. objectives
outside of anti-ISIS campaign, such as
reducing the Iranian military footprint in
Syria and helping to bring back millions of
refugees back to Syria? And what are the
risks of keeping U.S. troops in Syria?
This monograph explores these issues,
attempts to answer these difficult questions,
and offers policy recommendations for U.S.
strategic planners who deal with Syria in

2

particular and the Middle East in general.

Syria’s Geo-strategic
Importance

S

Y RI A is situated in the heart of the
Middle East, bordering the eastern
Mediterranean as well as countries—
Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Israel—
with which the United States has important
relationships and equities. On the symbolic
level, Syria is also important. The Syrian
capital of Damascus is one of the oldest
cities in the world and was the seat of the
famous Islamic Umayyad dynasty that
stretched from Spain in the west to India
and Central Asia in the east. In addition,
Damascus was one of the earliest centers of
Arab nationalism in the early 20th Century,
and was briefly, in 1920, the seat of a shortlived Arab kingdom of Syria under Faisal
bin Hussein of the Hashemite tribe, who
was one of the key leaders of the Arab revolt
against the Ottoman Turks during World
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
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In the post-independence period, Syria went
through many military coups and regimes and
was frequently a country of contestation between
Egypt and Iraq.
War I. This independent kingdom lasted
only a few months, however, as French
forces drove into Syria to establish their
Mandate, which lasted from 1920 to 1946. 4
In the post-independence period, Syria
went through many military coups and
regimes and was frequently a country of
contestation between Egypt and Iraq. The
Soviet Union and the United States also vied
for influence in Syria. On the Arab-Israeli
dispute Syria often took a hardline stance
against the Jewish state. In some circles,
it became known as the “beating heart”5 of
the Arab world for its strong stand on Arab
nationalist issues, though it occasionally
entered into indirect peace talks with Israel
that were facilitated by Washington.

The Road to Civil War

W

HILE
flaunting its Arab
nationalist credentials, Syria has
also represented the diversity
of the Arab world, home to many different
religious sects and ethnic groups. Although
Arab Sunni Muslims are the demographic
majority6 in the country (about 65 percent),
they have not ruled the country since
the mid-1960s. In 1966, a member of the
Alawite minority (the Alawite sect is an
offshoot of Shi’i Islam), Salah Jadid, seized

power in a military coup. Four years
later, another Alawite, Hafez Assad, the
then-defense minister, seized power and
ruled the country until his death in 2000.
As a member of the Baath party, which
advocated secular Arab nationalism and
socialism, Hafez Assad promoted Syria
as a confrontational state against Israel,
though he scrupulously adhered to the
1974 disengagement agreement with Israel
in the aftermath of the 1973 October war
that was brokered by the United States.
At the same time, he enabled his own
sect to assume key positions of power,
particularly in the military and intelligence
fields. Because the Alawites only comprise
about 11-12 percent of the population,
Hafez Assad reached out to other minority
groups to bolster his political base. And
while his so-called “corrective movement”
reined in some of socialist excesses of the
radical Baathists who preceded him and
made accommodations with the Arab
Sunni merchant class, he also pursued a
hardline stance against Arab Sunnis who
were involved in the militant Muslim
Brotherhood organization that threatened
his regime in the late 1970s and early
1980s. After a brutally crushing a Muslim
Brotherhood uprising in the city of Hama
in 1982, any serious challenge to his rule
essentially evaporated.7

4 Ayse Tekdal Fildis, “The Trouble in Syria: Spawned by French Divide and Rule,” Middle East Policy Council, vol. XVIII,
no. 4 (winter 2017). https://www.mepc.org/troubles-syria-spawned-french-divide-and-rule
5 Dave McAvoy, “In isolated Syria, Assad shifts away from pan-Arabism,” The National, October 23, 2013. https://
www.thenational.ae/in-isolated-syria-assad-shifts-away-from-pan-arabism-1.297467
6 “Syria’s demographic map changes after seven years of war,” AFP, May 25, 2018. http://newsinfo.inquirer.
net/994259/syrias-demographic-map-changes-after-seven-years-of-war
7 Dasha Afansieva, “Banned in Syria, Muslim Brotherhood members trickle home,” Reuters, May 7, 2015. https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-brotherhood-idUSKBN0NR20Y20150507
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Bashar Assad, who had become the heir
apparent in Syria after his older brother
Bassel died in a 1994 car accident, took
power upon his father’s death in 2000 and
initially opened up the political system.
There were hopes both inside and outside

as well as in Europe. Germany is hosting
a million Syrian refugees, sparking a
nationalist backlash there, while the large
refugee communities in Lebanon, Jordan,
and Turkey have challenged the fragile
sectarian balances in those countries. In

The civil war has also become a national and
international tragedy.
Syria that he would be a reformer but, after
a short period of time, he clamped down on
dissent and reinstituted the authoritarian
system. Some scholars have maintained,
however, that he was still liked by a
majority of the population until the 2011
Arab Spring.8

addition, there are at least 6.6 million
internally displaced refugees in the
country,10 and significant parts of some
major Syria’s cities, like Homs, remain
uninhabitable after shelling and bombings
by government forces and look like photos
of Berlin, Germany in May 1945.

The Syria civil war, which grew out of
peaceful demonstrations in 2011 against
Bashar Assad’s rule, soon morphed into
a bloody struggle and took on aspects
of a sectarian conflict. Although some
intellectuals from various minority groups
took part in the initial protests in 2011,
the vast majority of the protestors and
later, the rebels, came from Arab Sunni
Muslim backgrounds,9 and as time went
on, Islamist extremist factions within
this group came to predominate. The
civil war has also become a national and
international tragedy. Perhaps 400,000
people have died in the conflict and at
least 5.6 million Syrians—roughly onefourth of the population—have become
refugees, mostly in neighboring countries

On top of this humanitarian disaster (and
contributing to it), is the fact that Syria has
become a place for various regional powers
and proxy forces, plus international players,
to pursue their own agendas. Iran and
Russia have intervened on the side of the
Assad government with troops, military
assistance and, in Iran’s case, Shia militias
from various countries including thousands
of Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon and
Shia volunteers as far away as Afghanistan
and Pakistan. There are an estimated 3,000
Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) in Syria,11 plus around 20,000 Shia
militiamen12 in addition to thousands of
Hezbollah fighters in Syria. These forces,
with Russian air support, helped to turn
the tide of the civil war in Assad’s favor by

8 David W. Lesch, “Anatomy of an Uprising: Bashar al-Assad’s Fateful Choices That Launched a Civil War,” in Mark
L. Haas and David W. Lesch, eds., The Arab Spring: The Hope and Reality of the Uprisings, 2nd edition (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 2017), p. 91.
9 For an excellent sectarian analysis of the Syrian civil war, see Fabrice Balanche, Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War
(Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018), p. 5.
10 “Syria emergency: UNHCR/USA,” 2018. http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/syria-emergency.html
11 Bel Trew, “As the Syrian war draws to a close, the real question is what Israel and Iran do,” The Independent,
August 25, 2018. https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/us-war-syria-force-all-out-war-israel-trump-rouhanihezbollah-a8506696.html
12 Nadav Ben Hour and Michael Eisenstadt, “The Great Middle Eastern War of 2019,” American Interest, August 20,
2018. The authors cite a figure of more than 20,000 Iranian-trained Shia militiamen in Syria, though other sources give
a much higher figure. https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/08/20/the-great-middle-eastern-war-of-2019/
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early 2016 after loyalist government forces
had suffered many losses and various
rebel forces had been on the ascendancy.
Although President Barack Obama called
for Assad to step down from power and
he authorized some covert assistance to
moderate rebels,13 such as the Free Syrian
Army (a largely secular force fighting the
Assad government), he clearly did not want
the United States to get bogged down in
the civil war. His administration, however,
did provide hundreds of millions of dollars
to the United Nations for Syrian refugee
assistance.
As for regional countries outside of Iran,
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey aided
some Islamist forces14 within the rebel
camp, while Jordan reportedly joined the
United States in providing some assistance
to the Free Syrian Army.15 This force has
now been severely weakened, and the
United States is no longer providing visible
aid. Meanwhile, Israel has undertaken
over 130 airstrikes in Syria since the civil
war began,16 mostly against Hezbollah and
other Iranian-supported militias that it
has seen as a threat. In May 2018, Iranian
forces in Syria fired 20 missiles at Israeli
military positions in the Golan Heights.
Although only four of the twenty missiles
made it over the border, Israel retaliated

by having its aircraft hit seventy Iranian
targets in Syria, including a base south of
Damascus from which the twenty missiles
were allegedly launched.17 In addition to
targeting Iranian and Iranian-supported
militias, Israel has also clashed with some
ISIS militants. In early August 2018, Israeli
forces killed seven ISIS fighters who were
allegedly trying to cross into the Golan
Heights.18
The civil war presented an opportunity for
Islamist extremists to exploit the chaos. An
al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, which
now goes by the name Hay’at Tahrir alSham, became active in the country, while
a rival al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, led by
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who was originally
from al-Qaeda in Iraq, wanted to be the
undisputed radical Islamist leader. When
al-Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri ordered
that the two groups merge, al-Baghdadi
spurned this directive and decided to
branch off on his own. He renamed his
group the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq
(ISIS) in 2014 and declared himself caliph.
This declaration prompted an angry
denunciation by Zawahiri who mocked alBaghdadi’s self-promotion as leader of all
Muslims.19
ISIS’s battlefield successes, however, soon

13 Elise Labott, “Obama authorized covert support for Syrian rebels, sources say,” CNN, August 1, 2012. https://
www.cnn.com/2012/08/01/us/syria-rebels-us-aid/index.html
14 Kim Sengupta, “Turkey and Saudi Arabia alarm the West by backing Islamist extremists the Americans had
bombed in Syria, The Independent, May 12, 2015. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-crisisturkey-and-saudi-arabia-shock-western-countries-by-supporting-anti-assad-jihadists-10242747.html
15 “US Fully Suspends Its Support for Free Syrian Army. Shuts Down Operation rooms in Turkey and Jordan,”
Southfront, December 21, 2018. https://southfront.org/us-fully-suspends-its-support-for-free-syrian-army-shuts-downoperation-rooms-in-turkey-and-jordan-report/
16 Nadav Ben Hour and Michael Eisenstadt, “The Great Middle Eastern War of 2019.” The American Interest, August
20, 2018. https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/08/20/the-great-middle-eastern-war-of-2019/
17 Bel Trew, “As the Syrian war draws to a close, the real question is what Israel and Iran do,” The Independent,
August 25, 2018. https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/us-war-syria-force-all-out-war-israel-trump-rouhanihezbollah-a8506696.html
18 Jacob Magid and AFP, “IDF: Airstrikes kill 7 IS gunmen who crossed from Syria into Israeli territory,” Times of
Israel, August 2, 2018. https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-airstrike-said-to-kill-7-gunmen-in-syria-close-to-israeli-border/
19 James Gordon Meek, “Al Qaeda Leader Al-Zawahiri Declares War on ISIS ‘Caliph’ Al-Baghdadi,” ABC News,
September 10, 2015. https://abcnews.go.com/International/al-qaeda-leader-al-zawahiri-declares-war-isis/
story?id=33656684
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A soldier conducts artillery strikes with an M109A6 Paladin howitzer at Al-Taqaddum Air
Base, Iraq, June 27, 2016, to support Operation Inherent Resolve. (Marine Corps photo by
Sgt. Donald Holbert).
redounded to al-Baghdadi’s favor.
By
the summer of 2014, not only did ISIS
occupy much of central and eastern Syria,
establishing its so-called caliphate capital
in Raqqa along the Euphrates River, but it
also captured much of western, northern
and central Iraq. The rapid territorial gains
by ISIS and its self-declared caliphate soon
captured the imagination of many radical
Muslim youth not only in the Islamic world
but also in Western countries, particularly
in Europe. An estimated 30,000 Islamist
radicals came to Syria to join ISIS,20 helping
to strengthen its ranks to as many as 100,000
fighters and helped to bolster its rather
sophisticated social media propaganda
operations. Many al-Qaeda affiliates in the
Middle East region soon switched bayah
(allegiance) to al-Baghdadi as result of his
organization’s initial successes.

U.S. Military Involvement
in Syria

T

HE rapid ISIS advance in Iraq to
near the gates of Baghdad in 2014
prompted President Barack Obama
to send several thousand U.S. troops back
to Iraq to retrain the Iraqi military and
to provide air support for U.S. and antiISIS coalition air force strikes against ISIS
targets. He also authorized U.S. coalition
air strikes against ISIS targets in Syria
in late September 2014 and sent a small
detachment of 50 U.S. Special Forces to
Syria to help train Syrian Kurdish forces
in the northeastern part of that country
fighting ISIS in 2015. 21 This indigenous
group took on the name of the Syrian
Democratic Forces in October 2015. It has
been made up largely of Syrian Kurdish

20 “How real is the threat of returning IS fighters?” BBC News, October 23, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-41679377
21 Kevin Rawlinson, “Barack Obama to send more soldiers to fight Islamic State in Syria,” The Guardian, April 24,
2016. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/apr/25/barack-obama-us-soldiers-islamic-state-syria
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fighters affiliated with the YPG (People’s
Protection Units) of the PYD (Democratic
Unionist Party), plus some Arab Sunni
Muslim tribesmen opposed to ISIS. In
April 2016, President Obama announced
that he would increase the number of
U.S. Special Forces in Syria by 250, a sixfold increase from what the U.S. military
presence was previously.22 Later on it was
revealed that the number of U.S. Special
Forces, plus a U.S. Marine Corps unit, had
increased the number of U.S. military
personnel in Syria to around 2,000 as the
fight to take Raqqa from ISIS intensified. 23
These U.S. forces not only helped to train
the Syrian Democratic Forces and provide
them with logistical assistance but, like
in Iraq, they also assisted the U.S. and
coalition air war against ISIS targets in
Syria, and even engaged in a few direct
clashes with ISIS. 24
However, President Obama in April 2016
emphasized that U.S. forces in Syria were
not going to be spearheading the fight. He
stated: “They’re not going to be leading
the fight on the ground, but they will be
essential in providing the training and
assisting local forces as they continue to
drive ISIL (ISIS) back.”25 As one defense
analyst noted at the time, U.S. military
forces in Syria were “going to assist
our Kurdish YPG friends to widen and
deepen their offensive against [ISIS] in

northeastern Syria.”26
These U.S. forces were not in Syria at the
invitation of the Assad government but
were there as part of the 2001 Authorization
for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) that,
within the U.S. context, gave authorization
to the U.S. President to fight against Al
Qaeda affiliates broadly defined. Even
though ISIS had broken from al Qaeda,
U.S. officials believed the deployment of
U.S. troops in eastern Syria was justified
by claiming that ISIS, as a terrorist
organization, was a threat to the U.S.
homeland since ISIS propaganda on social
media did mention to its sympathizers that
they should strike the United States and
other Western nations even if only with
rudimentary weapons and equipment.27
In any event, the Assad government
generally did not do much to oppose
the presence of these U.S. forces in
northeastern Syria, except for issuing some
statements opposing it,28 largely because
the regime has lost jurisdiction over this
area, did not have the troops to retake it,
and was probably happy that ISIS was being
bludgeoned there. Over time, part of the
area, adjacent to the Turkish border, came
under the control of the Syrian Kurds who
established their own administration, flying
their own flag. They initially called the
area “Rojava” (meaning west in the Kurdish

22 Roberta Rampton, “Obama sends more Special Forces to Syria in fight against IS,” Reuters, April 24, 2016. https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-usa-syria/obama-sends-more-special-forces-to-syria-in-fight-against-isidUSKCN0XL0ZE
23 John Ismay, “US Says 2,000 Troops are in Syria, a Fourfold Increase,” New York Times, December 6, 2017. https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/12/06/world/middleeast/us-troops-syria.html
24 Matthew Cox, “Marines Engage in Direct Gunfights with ISIS in Syria, Commander Says,” Military.com, June 9,
2018. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/06/09/marines-engaged-direct-gunfights-isis-syria-commander-says.
html
25 Roberta Rampton, “Obama sends more Special Forces to Syria in fight against IS,” Reuters, April 24, 2016. https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-usa-syria/obama-sends-more-special-forces-to-syria-in-fight-against-isidUSKCN0XL0ZE
26 Ibid.
27 Garrett Epps, “The War That Congress Won’t Declare,” The Atlantic, August 22, 2015. https://www.theatlantic.
com/politics/archive/2015/08/aumf-isis/402017/
28 Liz Sly, “Assad: U.S. troops must leave Syria,” The Washington Post, June 1, 2018.
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Air Force MC-130 Hercules aircraft crew chiefs prepare cargo and supplies for an airdrop
over Syria, June 22, 2017. (Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Jason Robertson).
language, signaling the western part of
historic Kurdistan), but it is now called
the Democratic Federation of Northern
Syria to make it sound more of a regional
rather than an ethnic autonomous zone.
This administration, though dominated by
Kurds, includes some Assyrian Christians
and Arab Sunni Muslims. 29
U.S. military forces found that the Kurds
of this area were the most committed
and capable forces fighting against ISIS
and developed a close relationship with
them. This involved not only military
training and the provision of weapons but
also logistics for ground operations. U.S.
military commanders grew to respect these

Kurds and their willingness to put their
lives on the line in helping to destroy ISIS
and roll back its territorial gains. 30
President Trump, despite his campaign
comments that he would pursue a tougher
line against ISIS than President Obama,
essentially pursued the same policy in
Syria. In other words, he supported the
SDF in its fight against ISIS with a relatively
light U.S. military footprint and continued
the air war, with coalition partners, against
ISIS targets. The one main difference was
that U.S. military commanders in both Iraq
and Syria were given more leeway to make
targeting and force deployment decisions
without checking in with Washington.31

29 For a sympathetic assessment of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, see Rahila Gupta, “The world’s
most progressive democracy is being born. Don’t let it get strangled,” CNN.com, February 12, 2018. https://www.cnn.
com/2018/02/12/opinions/worlds-most-progressive-democracy-born-dont-let-turkey-strange-it-opinion-gupta/index.
html
30 Rod Nordland, “On the Northern Syrian Front, U.S. and Turkey Head Into Tense Face-off,” New York Times,
February 7, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/07/world/middleeast/us-turkey-manbij-kurds.html
31 Dion Nissenbaum and Maria Abi-Habib, “Trump Gives Generals More Freedom on ISIS fight,” The Wall Street
Journal, April 14, 2017. https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-gives-generals-free-rein-on-isis-fight-1492218994
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Sharp Differences with Turkey
Over U.S. Support for Syrian
Kurds

A

major problem was that Turkey
saw the YPG and the PYD as an
extension of the PKK (Kurdish
Workers Party) that Ankara has long
considered a terrorist organization. From
the Turkish government’s perspective the
PKK was establishing a “terrorist” enclave32
to its immediate south and feared that this
entity would encourage the PKK in Turkey
to do the same.
Even though the United States has
also categorized the PKK as a terrorist
organization, it has refused to pin this label
on the YPG and the PYD. U.S. military
commanders on the ground in Syria have
praised the YPG’s fighting abilities against
ISIS. One stated, for example, “When
nobody else could do it, they took Raqqa
[from ISIS in December 2017]. I think that
has earned them a seat at the table.”33 This
stark difference in how the United States
and Turkey viewed these Syrian Kurdish
fighters prompted an extraordinary spat
between the U.S. military and Turkey that
took place in early 2018.
For example, in response to Turkish
President Recip Tayyip Erdogan’s remarks
that he would not tolerate a “terrorist army”
on its southern border and that he could
not guarantee the safety of the U.S. military

in northern Syria if they stood in the way
of a Turkish incursion, Lt. General Paul
Funk said: “[I]f you hit us, we will respond
aggressively. We will defend ourselves.”34
This comment then prompted Erdogan
to issue more threats, stating: “To those
who say, ‘if they hit us, we will respond
with force,’ it is clear that they have never
experienced the Ottoman slap.”35
There was also concern by the U.S. military
over the Turkish incursion into the Afrin
area of northwestern Syria, which is a
largely a Kurdish ethnic enclave. The
Turks wanted to clear the area of the YPG
because it did not want the Afrin area to be
linked up to the Kurdish areas in Syria east
of the Euphrates River. When the Turks
invaded this area in late January 2018,
the U.S. Government issued a statement
calling on the Turks to “use restraint,”36
while U.S. military commanders in Syria
lamented that the operation had hindered
the campaign to wipe out the last ISIS
strongholds in eastern Syria because so
many YPG fighters within the SDF had
gone to Afrin to aide their comrades.37
This crisis prompted then-Secretary of
State Rex Tillerson to travel to Ankara in
February 2018 in an attempt to ease U.S.Turkish tensions. Although the fate of the
Kurdish enclave in northeastern Syria was
left unresolved, the United States appears
to have tacitly accepted the removal of
the YPG from the Afrin area and agreed

32 Gul Tuysuz, Schams Elwazer, and Hilary Clarke, “Erdogan accuses US of creating Kurdish terror enclave on Turkish
border,” CNN.com, January 16, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/15/middleeast/erdogan-us-terror/index.html
33 “At U.S. outpost in Syria, U.S. general backs Kurdish fighters,” Associated Press, February 7, 2018.
https://wtop.com/middle-east/2018/02/at-us-outpost-in-syria-us-general-backs-kurdish-fighters/
34 Rod Nordland, “On the Northern Syrian Front, U.S. and Turkey Head Into Tense Face-off,” New York Times,
February 7, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/07/world/middleeast/us-turkey-manbij-kurds.html
35 “Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatens US forces with ‘Ottoman slap,’” Washington Examiner, February 13, 2018.
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/recep-tayyip-erdogan-threatens-us-forces-with-ottoman-slap
36 “US tells Turkey to show ‘restraint’ with Syria Kurds,” Deutsche Welle, January 21, 2018. https://www.dw.com/en/
us-tells-turkey-to-show-restraint-with-syria-kurds/a-42247165
37 Eric Schmitt and Rod Nordland, “Amid Turkish Assault, Kurdish Forces are Drawn Away From U.S. Fight With
ISIS,” New York Times, February 28, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/world/middleeast/syrian-kurds-isisamerican-offensive.html
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U.S. soldiers maneuver toward a coordination point to link up visual and radio
communication with Turkish soldiers while conducting a coordinated, independent
patrol outside Manbij, Syria, July 16, 2018. The United States and Turkey began conducting
independent, coordinated patrols to help reinforce the safety and security in the region
after the elimination of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. (Army photo by SSG Timothy
R. Koster).
to joint U.S.-Turkish patrols in the Syrian
city of Manbij that straddles the Euphrates
River in north central Syria and lies
in-between Afrin and northeastern part of
the country.38 These joint patrols have been
in operation since the summer of 2018.39

U.S. Security Dilemmas in
Northeastern Syria

W

HILE the U.S. military presence
in northeastern Syria played an
important support role in the

near defeat of ISIS, it inadvertently fostered
additional problems: ethnic tensions
between Kurds and Arabs; possible
confrontation with the Syrian government;
ability of U.S. forces to withdraw without
leaving the Syrian Kurds to the mercy of
either the Assad government or Turkey.
Each of these problems is explained below:
1) The U.S.-supported SDF now
occupy a fourth of the country,
basically most of the area east of the
Euphrates River from the Turkish

38 “US and Turkey agree to mend ties after Tillerson holds talks in Ankara,” Reuters, February 16, 2018. https://
www.thenational.ae/world/mena/us-and-turkey-agree-to-mend-ties-after-tillerson-holds-talks-in-ankara-1.705200.
See also Karen DeYoung and Erin Cunningham, “Accord seeks to defuse U.S.-Turkish tension over Syrian town,” The
Washington Post, June 6, 2018.
39 Kyle Rempfer, “US and Turkish troops coordinate patrols in tense Manbij region of Syria,” Army Times, July 26,
2018. https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-air-force/2018/07/26/us-and-turkish-troops-coordinate-patrols-in-tensemanbij-region-of-syria/

10

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. POLICY

border to the Iraqi border. Part of
this area was under ISIS’s control,
particularly the towns along the
Euphrates River. ISIS is believed
to hold some desert territory in
the eastern part of this region next
to the Iraqi border. The area also
includes Syria’s main oil region near
the city of Deir el-Zor. 40 Although
the Kurdish-dominated SDF is the
main military power in the area,
supported by the United States, most
of the area, except for the Kurdishpopulated northeastern corridor, is
inhabited by Arab Sunni Muslims. 41
Since the defeat of ISIS in Raqqa in
October 2017, U.S. civilian officials
have helped anti-ISIS Arab Sunni
Muslims to form local councils to
run the municipalities. 42 Although
this effort has been welcomed by
local residents, there are tensions
between the Arabs in the cities and
towns and Kurdish SDF military
units. One Arab resident of Raqqa
after ISIS was defeated there wrote
sarcastically that PKK leader Ocalan
was now the new ‘”caliph” in the
city. 43 The SDF, as mentioned earlier,
has a significant proportion of Arab
fighters, and U.S. officials have been
doing their best to increase their
number to help patrol and protect
liberated Arab cities and towns,
but there are not enough of them.

Moreover, the Kurds predominate in
the SDF’s officer corps. 44
2) ISIS is down but not out. As
mentioned earlier, some of their
fighters in Syria are now believed to
be concentrated in a desert area along
the Iraqi border so the campaign is
unfinished. In mid-August 2018, the
Washington Post reported that there
were still a significant number of ISIS
fighters in Syria and Iraq. It cited
a report from the UN Analytical
Support and Monitoring Team that
claimed that there were between
20,000 and 30,000 ISIS fighters
across Syria and Iraq, divided roughly
equally between the two countries.
The same Washington Post report
quoted a U.S. military spokesman
who said these figures “seemed high”
but added that ISIS remained a threat
and vowed to “pursue them until they
are completely defeated.”45 What
was perhaps more revealing from
the UN report was its assessment
that ISIS had “rallied” from the twomonth pause in SDF operations
earlier in the year when Syrian
Kurdish fighters had gone to Afrin
to try to halt the Turkish offensive
against fellow Kurds in that area.
This pause allowed ISIS “breathing
space to prepare for the next phase
of its evolution into a global covert

40 Sarah El Deeb, “US-backed forces take Syria’s largest oil field from Islamic State,” Associated Press, October 23,
2017. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-syria-oil-field-islamic-state-20171022-story.html#
41 Fabrice Balanche, p. 60.
42 Hadi Haid, “Local Participation is Important to Post-ISIS Governance in Raqqa,” newsdeeply.com, May 16, 2017.
https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/community/2017/05/16/local-participation-is-important-to-post-isis-governancein-raqqa. See also John Davison and Tom Perry, “After victory in Raqqa over IS, Kurds face tricky peace,” Reuters,
October 17, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-raqqa-future-ana/after-victory-in-raqqa-overis-kurds-face-tricky-peace-idUSKBN1CM2C6
43 Louisa Loveluck, “US-led coalition declares ISIS forces vanquished, battle for Raqqa over,” The Washington Post,
October 20, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-led-coalition-declares-isis-forces-vanquished-battle-forraqqa-over/2017/10/20/85da033a-b4f6-11e7-9b93-b97043e57a22_story.html?utm_term=.9029b2892813
44 There are conflicting figures on the actual number of Arab fighters within the SDF. See Fabrice Balanche, pp. 64-65.
45 Liz Sly, “30,000 Islamic State fighters remain in Iraq and Syria, new report says,” The Washington Post, August 15,
2018.
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network.”46 Indeed, a week later
(August 22, 2018), ISIS leader Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi delivered a message
to mark the Islamic Eid al-Adha
holiday. While acknowledging that
ISIS has been expelled from much
of Syria and Iraq, he emphasized
that the “tides of war [do] change.”
He then urged his followers to carry
out attacks in the West by stabbings,
gunfire, bombings or using vehicles
to run over individuals. 47
The United States and its allies
believe it is important for the
U.S. military to stay in Syria to
root out the last vestiges of ISIS,
a position that was mentioned in
late August 2018 by U.S. National
Security Adviser John Bolton. 48 The
problem is that Syrian government
forces and their allied Russian and
Iranian-backed Shia forces in the
southeast are also close to this ISIS
pocket, and the potential for clashes
between the United States and these
forces remains. Indeed, there were
a couple of clashes in this vicinity in
2017 after U.S. military commanders
warned government forces to stay
away from U.S. lines.
During
Congressional testimony, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. emphasized
that the U.S. military had responded
defensively. 49 There was also a rather
bizarre incident in February 2018

when a group of about 200 Russian
mercenaries was decimated by U.S.
aircraft and artillery after they
attacked a base in eastern Syria
housing SDF and U.S. military
advisors.50 The Russian government
did not make much of this incident,
perhaps because to do so would
acknowledge Moscow’s connections
to the mercenaries and because
Russian President Putin did not
want to damage his relationship with
President Trump. Although there
has been a de-confliction process
in place since the autumn of 2015
to prevent the U.S. and Russian air
forces from inadvertently engaging in
clashes or accidents in the skies above
Syria, the potential for U.S. clashes
with Syrian government troops and
its allied forces remains high.
3) As the outside power aiding the
Syrian Kurds in the fight against
ISIS, the United States has also
become their de-facto protector. A
symbiotic relationship between the
U.S. military and these Kurds has
developed. The U.S. military still
sees these Kurds as its best combat
ally against ISIS, and the Kurds see
the U.S. military as their protective
shield against Turkey, the Syrian
government, or another ISIS-like
group that may emerge. However,
comments by President Trump
earlier in 2018 about wanting to

46 Ibid.
47 Liz Sly, “ISIS ‘caliph’ breaks his long silence,” The Washington Post, August 23, 2018.
48 Don Williams, “Trump advisor Bolton says Russia ‘stuck’ in Syria, Iran must leave,” Reuters, August 22, 2018.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-usa-russia-inter/trump-adviser-bolton-says-russia-stuck-in-syriairan-must-leave-idUSKCN1L709R
49 Anne Bernard, “Russia and Syria Denounce US Airstrikes on Pro-Assad Militia,” New York Times, May 19, 2017.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/19/world/middleeast/syria-russia-us-convoy.html
50 Mike Eckel, “CIA Director: ‘Couple of Hundred Russians’ Killed in February U.S. Assault in Syria, Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty, April 12, 2018. https://www.rferl.org/a/cia-director-couple-hundred-russians-killed-in-february-u-s-assaultin-syria/29162797.html
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withdraw U.S. troops from Syria have
made the Kurds nervous.51
Despite the fact that President
Trump has backtracked from these
comments and that some of his top
officials in his administration have
spoken about an “enduring” U.S.
presence in Syria52 to ensure the
defeat of ISIS, it appears that the
Kurds are hedging their bets. In July
and August 2018, the political wing
of the SDF, now called the Syrian
Democratic Council, began talks
with the Syrian government for a
“roadmap leading to a democratic
and decentralized Syria.”53 It is unclear
how these will fare. Moreover, even
though the Syrian regime has endorsed
the concept of de-centralization, the
word has different interpretations.
One scholar has noted that for the
regime, de-centralization means
local administration, whereas for
the Kurds, it means federalism.54
Although the Syrian Foreign Minister
Walid al-Muallem in 2017 did show
some flexibility in saying that the
government would be open to a
limited degree of self-rule,55 the
Syrian Kurds are approaching the

talks with a good deal of skepticism.
Furthermore, the aggression and
confidence showed by the Syrian
regime, backed by Russia and Iran, in
occupying areas of the country that
had been outside of its control for
several years, has undoubtedly added
to the Kurds’ worries.

Conflicts in Other Parts of Syria

H

AV ING routed the rebels from
suburbs around Damascus and in
areas near the Jordanian border
and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights in
2018 (only a few pockets of rebels are left in
this region), the Syrian regime now appears
to be setting its sights on the Idlib province
in the country’s northwest, the last major
rebel stronghold. This province contains
3 million people, some of whom have fled
from other parts of Syria, an estimated
70,000 rebel fighters, including al-Qaeda’s
affiliate, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, and some
Turkish troops who have been reinforcing
their observation posts during the summer
of 2018.56 Turkish President Erdogan has
warned the Syrian government and outside
parties that Idlib is a “red line” and vowed
to resist any attempt to take it away from
Turkey’s sphere of influence.57 A major push

51 Ellen Francis, “Wary of US Ally, Syrian Kurds look to Damascus for talks,” Reuters, July 25, 2018. https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-kurds/wary-of-u-s-ally-syrian-kurds-look-to-damascus-for-talksidUSKBN1KF2NN
52 Laura Rozen, “Pompeo names high-level Syria team as Trump looks for the exit,” Al-Monitor, August 21, 2018.
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/08/pompeo-names-high-level-syria-team.html
53 “US-backed opposition authorities in northern Syria push for ‘de-centralization’ agreement with Damascus: SDF,”
Syria Direct, July 30, 2018. https://syriadirect.org/news/us-backed-opposition-authorities-in-northern-syria-push-for-‘decentralization’-agreement-with-damascus-sdf/. See also, “Syrian Kurdish-led council visits Damascus for new talks: cochair,” Reuters, August 14, 2018. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2018-08-14/syrian-kurdish-led-councilvisits-damascus-for-new-talks-report
54 Ibid.
55 Tom O’Conner, “Will War in Syria End? US Allies Prepare to Rebuild Ties to Assad After Trump’s Talk With Putin,”
Newsweek, July 17, 2018. https://www.newsweek.com/us-allies-syria-prepare-rebuild-ties-assad-after-trump-talkputin-1029017
56 Liz Sly, “Syria’s war could be entering its last and most dangerous phase,” The Washington Post, August 10, 2018.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syrias-war-could-be-entering-its-last-and-most-dangerous-phase/2018/08/09/
e9e60442-8f60-11e8-ae59-01880eac5f1d_story.html?utm_term=.970de812c8b5
57 Reema Hibrawi, “The Sticky Situation of the Final Idlib Offensive,” Atlantic Council, August 15, 2018. http://www.
atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/the-sticky-situation-of-the-final-idlib-offensive
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U.S. soldiers and Iraqi Security Force fire a howitzer at known Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria locations near the Iraqi-Syrian border during Operation Roundup, June 5, 2018.
The soldiers are assigned to the 3rd Cavalry Regiment. (Army photo by SPC Anthony
Zendejas IV).
by the Syrian government into Idlib, some
analysts have warned, would not only cause
further bloodshed but would exacerbate
the refugee crisis,58 as many civilians would
try to flee into Turkey and, from there, to
the European mainland.
Some reports have suggested that the
Russians would prefer to have Idlib
absorbed back into the Syrian state without
bloodshed, in part because an offensive
would strain their warming relations with
Turkey, as the Syrian government would
likely want Russian air support in a military
engagement.59

However, the status quo would keep a
strategically important province outside
of the Syrian government’s writ and would
allow al-Qaeda’s affiliate to continue to
operate in the region. Hence, it seems that
the Assad government, despite possible
Russian advice to the contrary, might
indeed launch an offensive the retake the
area.
From the U.S. perspective, preventing
another large refugee flow outside of Syria
would be in its interests, as the refugee issue
has put a strain on neighboring countries
like Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon, and has

58 Ibid.
59 Liz Sly, “Syria’s war could be entering its last and most dangerous phase,” The Washington Post, August 10, 2018.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syrias-war-could-be-entering-its-last-and-most-dangerous-phase/2018/08/09/
e9e60442-8f60-11e8-ae59-01880eac5f1d_story.html?utm_term=.970de812c8b5
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The US-Iran and Israel-Iran
Conflict

fed right-wing movements in Europe that
are not only morally repugnant but are also
no friends of the United States.60 Many of
these right-wing movements share more
values with the autocratic Russian leader
Vladimir Putin than with U.S. and European
democratic traditions.

O

As of this writing (August 2018), the Trump
administration has only issued warnings
that it would respond by force against the
Syrian government if it used chemical
weapons in an Idlib offensive, similar to
U.S. air attacks in April 2017 and April
2018 (the latter in conjunction with Britain
and France).61 But while these retaliatory
actions were important in laying down a
marker about further chemical attacks by
the Syrian regime, they did not stop the
Assad’s government’s offensive aimed at
regaining territory that had been in rebel
hands. Moreover, the Syrian government
has shown that it is very capable of using
conventional weaponry and so-called
barrel bombs against civilians, which have
actually caused more casualties that its
use of chemical weapons. A pending Idlib
offensive thus poses another dilemma for
U.S. security planners. To stand idly by
while more civilians are killed or made
into new refugees would be a stain on
the United States and the international
community, but to intervene against such
an offensive might put the United States
on the same side as al-Qaeda and run the
risks of putting U.S. troops in conflict with
Syrian and Russian government forces.

Despite the new, hardline policies the
Trump administration is pursuing against
Iran, which is to include an oil embargo

NE of the stated objectives of the
United States in Syria is to prevent
Iran from establishing a so-called
land corridor from Tehran to Beirut,
through which it could funnel military
personnel and equipment into the heart of
the Arab world. This preventative goal was
enunciated by former Secretary of State Rex
Tillerson in January 2018 in a major policy
address on Syria at Stanford University.62
Although Tillerson was fired two months
later, the speech reflected the consensus
of the entire U.S. government at the time,
as it was cleared through the interagency
process.63
In May 2018, the Trump
administration took an even more hardline
position against Iran by pulling out of the
Iran nuclear deal, formally called the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action. Tillerson’s
successor, Mike Pompeo specified twelve
actions that Iran had to take to avoid strong
sanctions, including removing its forces
and those of its allied militias from Syria.64
These demands remain as U.S. policy, and
National Security Advisor Bolton stated in
August 2018 that not only does the United
States remain determined to finish off ISIS
in Syria but also to “deal with the presence
of the Iranians.”65 However, he did not say
how the latter would be accomplished.

60 Charles Hawley, “Europe’s Far-Right Flirts with Moscow,” Speigel Online, April 14, 2014. http://www.spiegel.de/
international/europe/european-far-right-developing-closer-ties-with-moscow-a-963878.html
61 Barbara Starr, “US on alert as Syrian regime prepares for assault on final rebel stronghold,” CNN.com, August 27,
2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/27/politics/us-alert-syria-idlib/index.html
62 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on the Way Forward for the United States Regarding
Syria” January 17, 2018. https://translations.state.gov/2018/01/17/secretary-of-state-rex-tillerson-on-the-way-forwardfor-the-united-states-regarding-syria/
63 Personal contacts with government sources.
64 “Mike Pompeo’s speech: What are the 12 demands given to Iran?” Al Jazeera, May 12, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.
com/news/2018/05/mike-pompeo-speech-12-demands-iran-180521151737787.html
65 Loveday Morris and Anton Troianovski, “Bolton: Putin would be happy if Iran left Syria,” The Washington Post,
August 23, 2018.
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Israel has vowed that it will not tolerate a long-term
Iranian presence in Syria because it sees Iran as its
mortal enemy.
and the placement of sanctions on
European companies doing business with
Iran, it does not appear to want an actual
war with Tehran. The stated hope is that
crippling sanctions would compel Iran to
stop meddling in the Arab world, not only
in Syria but also in other countries like
Yemen, and to come back to the negotiating
table and agree to give up its entire nuclear
program. This is a tall order and Tehran
is unlikely to comply even when faced with
mounting economic problems. So the
question remains, how is the United States
going to force Iran out of Syria, especially
when the Iranians are so heavily invested
in keeping the Assad regime in power and
ensuring that its supplies to Lebanon’s
Hezbollah organization (most of which
is done by air) is not interrupted? Bolton
has suggested that the Russians could be
induced to compel the Iranians to leave.
While on a trip to Israel in August 2018
Bolton said Russian President Putin told
Trump that an Iranian presence in Syria
does not conform to Russian interests and
that he (Putin) would “be content to see
Iranian forces all sent back to Iran.” Bolton
added that Putin said he could not do this
himself and that “a joint U.S.-Russia effort
may be needed.”66 But again, what such a
joint effort would entail remains unclear.

admitted that this objective was “far from
easy to achieve,” but added that he and his
Russian interlocutor “talked about a variety
of ways it might be accomplished through a
series of steps.” Bolton did say he rejected a
Russian proposal to constrict Iranian forces
to certain parts of Syria, away from Israel’s
border in exchange for the United States
suspending plans to impose an oil embargo
on Iran.67 In other words, this Russian idea
was dead on arrival because Washington
does not want to entertain any proposal
that would weaken its economic squeeze
on Iran.

A few days later, Bolton met with his
Russian counterpart in Geneva and
appeared less optimistic about removing
Iranian forces with Russian help. He

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has
underscored to Russian President Putin
in several face-to-face meetings the threat
posed by Iranian and Iranian proxy forces in

Another conflict looming over the horizon
is the potential for a major clash in Syria
between Israeli and Iranian forces as well
as those forces allied with Iran. Israel has
vowed that it will not tolerate a long-term
Iranian presence in Syria because it sees
Iran as its mortal enemy. As mentioned
earlier, Israel has conducted at least 130
air strikes in Syria since the civil war
began, often targeting Hezbollah forces,
Syrian government shipments of military
supplies to that organization, Iranian proxy
forces, and even an Iranian drone that had
ventured into Israeli air space.68 In addition,
Israel has also attacked ISIS positions near
the Golan Heights.

66 Ibid.
67 Karen DeYoung, “Bolton and his Russian counterpart discuss arms control, Syria and Iran,” The Washington Post,
August 24, 2018.
68 Loveday Morris and Ruth Eglash, “Israel says drone it shot down was Iranian copy of a U.S. craft,” The
Washington Post, February 12, 2018.
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Syria. Netanyahu also successfully lobbied
Putin not to supply Syria with the S300 antiaircraft system that could pose a threat to
Israeli aircraft.69 Russia has not interfered
with Israeli air strikes in Syria and has said
in the immediate aftermath of the TrumpPutin summit in Helsinki in July 2018 that
Iranian and Iranian proxy forces should
be at least 50 miles away from the Golan
Heights, but that is not sufficient from
Israel’s perspective.70 Netanyahu wants all
Iranian forces and Iranian-supported Shia
militias to leave Syria, which is also a U.S.
goal, as enunciated by both Pompeo and
Bolton.
However, Russia might not have the clout
or the willingness to force the Iranians
to leave Syria militarily.
Hence, the
potential for a major clash between Israel
and Iranian and Iranian proxy forces in
Syria remains a real possibility. This could
quickly evolve into a wider war, with Israel
attacking targets within Iran itself and
Hezbollah launching thousands of rockets
into northern Israel from its abundant
arsenal.71 If such a conflict takes place, the
likelihood of the United States, as an ally
of Israel, getting dragged in would increase.
Moreover, it is hard to imagine that Russia
would stay neutral as it would come under
pressure from both Syria and Iran to defend
Syrian air space. Such action would scuttle

Putin’s efforts over the past several years
to cultivate closer relations with Israel, but
he may decide that protecting his equities
with Syria and Iran are more important
than currying favor with Israel.
If a major military conflict between Israel
and Iran were to take place in Syria, U.S.
forces in the northeastern part of Syria
could be vulnerable to attack. Iran might
direct some of its Shia proxy forces to strike
U.S. forces to deter the United States from
assisting Israel and make its stay in Syria so
painful that Washington would decide to
leave altogether. This tactic was effectively
employed in the early 1980s by radical
Shia militias in Lebanon, prompting the
Reagan administration to move U.S. forces
“off-shore” as opposed to keeping them in
Beirut. On the other hand, during the few
military encounters between the United
States and Iranian proxy forces in Syria since
2017 the U.S. military has demonstrated
clear overmatch. Even though these Shia
proxy forces in Syria (about 20,000 men)
far outnumber U.S. forces (about 2,000),
the firepower and effectiveness of the U.S.
military would give Iran pause. Moreover,
if Iran were to direct such proxy forces to
attack U.S. military personnel in Syria,
it would have to worry about U.S. strikes
on Iran itself. The last major encounter
between U.S. and Iranian forces occurred in

If a major military conflict between Israel
and Iran were to take place in Syria, U.S. forces
in the northeastern part of Syria could be
vulnerable to attack.
69 Bel Trew, “As the Syrian war draws to a close, the real question is what Israel and Iran do now,” The
Independent, August 25, 2018. https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/us-war-syria-force-all-out-war-israel-trumprouhani-hezbollah-a8506696.html
70 “What Does the Ongoing Israeli-Iran Confrontation in Syria Mean?” Atlantic Council, August 2, 2018. http://www.
atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/what-does-the-ongoing-israel-iran-confrontation-in-syria-mean
71 Nadav Ben Hour and Michael Eisenstadt, “The Great Middle Eastern War of 2019” The American Interest, August
20, 2018. https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/08/20/the-great-middle-eastern-war-of-2019/
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U.S. soldiers and Iraqi Security Forces fire a howitzer at known Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria locations near the Iraqi-Syrian border during Operation Roundup, June 5, 2018.
The soldiers are assigned to the 3rd Cavalry Regiment. (Army photo by SPC Anthony
Zendejas IV).
the last two years (1987-88) of the Iran-Iraq
war and the U.S. military easily prevailed. 72
Hence, although there are certainly risks in
keeping U.S. military forces in northeastern
Syria over the coming years when the
possibility of an Israeli-Iran confrontation
looms over the horizon, the benefits
outweigh them. The potential advantages
of maintaining a U.S. military presence are
outlined next.

Military and Non-military Uses
of the U.S. Troop Presence in
Syria in the Near Future

A

recent study by two scholars
suggested that the presence of “even
a small U.S. military contingent in
northeastern Syria might discourage proIranian Shia militias from moving through
these areas to the front” in the event a
war were to develop between Iran and

72 F. Gregory Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015),
pp. 82-84.

18

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. POLICY

Israel. Such a U.S. presence, the authors
note, would limit these militias’ movement
to “a few roads in southeastern Syria—
thereby facilitating their interdiction by
Israel.”73 In other words, the U.S. military
presence would prevent the land corridor
that Tillerson mentioned in early 2018 from
developing. This blocking action would
not only hinder the shipment of men and
supplies during so-called normal times but
would serve to prevent Shia reinforcements
to their militia in a land war in Syria
between Iran and Israel.
Another benefit of a U.S. military presence
in northeastern Syria would be to enhance
the U.S. role in an international political
process that might take place on the future
of Syria. This same reason might be why
French President Macron sent a small
contingent of French forces from Iraq to
northeastern Syria in 2018.74 In other
words, boots on the ground give both the
United States and France some political
leverage, whereas their absence would
diminish their clout, especially as Russia
and Iran are unlikely to leave Syria anytime
soon. The fact that the U.S.-supported
SDF controls the oil regions near Deir elZor also gives Washington some economic
leverage over a future political settlement.
Past efforts through a so-called Geneva
process to find an acceptable outcome for
the Syrian crisis have all failed. Part of the
problem was that the Syrian opposition
wanted Assad gone, and that was not going
to happen as long as Assad believed he could
retain the loyalty of his troops and allies,
and prevail on the battlefield. Now that the

tide of the civil war has moved decidedly in
Assad’s favor there is even less of a chance
he will give up power. In addition, Russia,
Iran and Turkey all participated in a rival
political process, based on meetings in the
Kazakh city of Astana, that has purportedly
reached agreements on achieving various
so-called “de-escalation” accords,75 but
most of these have been violated by the
Assad regime which opted to recapture
more and more territory from rebel forces.
However, even though Assad is clearly in
the ascendancy, there are still a number
of issues that need to be settled for the
situation in Syria to be stabilized. These
include the rebuilding of damaged parts of
Syria and the return of the refugees. The
recent decision of the Trump administration
to withhold $230 million it initially pledged
for Syrian rebuilding efforts at least while
Assad remains in power, while intended
to encourage other nations to bear most
of the costs,76 may be seen by some that
the United States does not care very much
about Syria’s future. While it is important
for the international community to be
more involved in this stabilization process,
diminished U.S. funding, even if temporary,
may discourage other actors from fulfilling
their own commitments.

Policy Recommendations

T

HE preceding analysis has painted
a picture of a fractured country
that might still experience even
more violence and dislocations in the near
future. U.S. policymakers in the national
security disciplines should accept certain

73 Nadav Ben Hour and Michael Eisenstadt, “The Great Middle Eastern War of 2019” The American Interest, August
20, 2018. https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/08/20/the-great-middle-eastern-war-of-2019/
74 Fergus Kelly, “French and US troops are operating on the ground, northern Syria official says,” The Defense Post,
April 3, 2018. https://thedefensepost.com/2018/04/03/french-us-troops-manbij-tal-abyad-syria/
75 Reema Hibrawi, “The Sticky Situation of the Final Idlib Offensive,” Atlantic Council, August 15, 2018. http://www.
atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/the-sticky-situation-of-the-final-idlib-offensive
76 Karen DeYoung, “Others to pay $230 million U.S. had planned for Syrian rebuilding,” The Washington Post, August
18, 2018.
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realities in Syria while working toward the
following objectives:
n However unsavory, U.S. national
security policymakers must accept
the notion that Assad is unlikely
to step down from power and,
therefore, will remain the president
of Syria into the foreseeable future.
He is likely to retain the support of
a significant portion of the Syrian
population, particularly the Alawites
and other minority groups, plus some
Arab Sunni Muslims who simply
want a return to the status quo ante
when peace prevailed. Importantly,
both Russia and Iran see Syria under
Assad as a valuable strategic asset.
Russia values its longtime naval base
at Tartous on Syria’s Mediterranean
coast and its new Hmeimim air
base near the city of Latakia.77 For
Putin, such assets give Russia
strategic depth in the heart of the
Arab world and allow Russia to be a
major player once again the Middle
East. For Iran, its deepening alliance
with Assad helps to enhance its role
in the Arab world and facilitates
its connections to Hezbollah in
neighboring Lebanon.
Moreover,
through its position in Syria, Iran can
show its enemies in the Arab world,
like Saudi Arabia, that it is a force
to contend with and that it intends
to counterbalance the tacit alliance
between Israel and some Sunni Arab
states that emerged in recent years.
n The United States must finish the

job of defeating the last remnants
of the ISIS and ensure that another
Sunni extremist group does not
emerge in Syria in the future.78 This
means that the United States must
continue to work in the Arab Sunni
Muslim areas of eastern Syria to
ensure that this area, particularly
the bombed parts of the city of
Raqqa, are rebuilt and that the
Kurdish military footprint in places
like Raqqa and areas further to the
southeast is minimal. More efforts
by the United States and coalition
partners must be made to recruit
Arab Sunni tribesmen into the SDF
and ensure that such forces patrol
and protect this part of Syria to avoid
ethnic antagonisms.
n Along these lines, Washington
should desist from the idea of
convincing Arab militaries coming
into Syria for stabilization purposes.
Such an idea never really had the
support of the Egyptians and the
Saudis,79 with whom the Trump
administration initially tried to
induce for this purpose, and their
presence in Syria would likely stoke
more problems than help. Egypt’s
union with Syria from 1958 to 1961
proved to be highly problematic, as
the Syrians came to resent Egypt’s
domineering position in their
country, while the Saudis may be
worried that many Syrians have come
to resent its support for some Islamist
groups within the rebel camp in
the current civil war. However, the

77 Daniel Brown, “These are the 11 types of Russian military jets and planes known to be stationed in Syria,” Business
Insider, February 26, 2018. https://www.businessinsider.com/these-are-the-10-russian-military-aircraft-stationed-insyria-2017-10
78 Missy Ryan and Paul Sonne, “As Trump urges Syria exit, troops see unfinished job,” The Washington Post, April 8,
2018.
79 Julian Borger, “Syria: proposal to replace US troops with Arab force comes with grave risks, The Guardian, April
18, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/apr/18/us-syria-arab-force-replace-american-troops-saudi-arabiaegypt-uae
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oil-rich Arab countries like Saudi
Arabia can play a role in providing
reconstruction funds to help rebuild
damaged Syrian cities and resettle
Syrian refugees back in their homes.
The Saudis and other Gulf countries
would have to swallow the bitter pill
of tacitly accepting the rule of Bashar
Assad, but over the past year the
Arab world has begun to accept that
Assad is likely to remain in power.
n The United States should support
the idea of a kind of loose federalism
in Syria to ensure that the Kurds
of northeastern Syria retain their
autonomy. To do otherwise would
abandon these Kurds, who have
been very supportive U.S. allies, to
an uncertain fate and would set a
bad precedent for other groups in
the Middle East region and beyond
who have cooperated with the
United States in counter-terrorism
operations. To obtain buy-in from
the Syrian government for this idea,
the SDF should relinquish the oil
fields under its control south of this
area and agree that border patrols
be administered jointly between
the Kurds and Syrian government
forces. This will help reinforce the
notion that federalism does not
mean separation from Syria. In
other words, the Kurds would be in
charge of local administration but
would recognize the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Syrian
state.
On the issue of Turkey’s opposition to
the Kurdish autonomous zone in the
northeastern part of Syria, the United
States should pursue a mix of carrots

and sticks. It should encourage the local
Kurdish administration to bring in nonPYD members to dilute the connection
to the PKK, discourage YPG fighters from
trying to reclaim the Afrin area, and pledge
not to opt for an independent state. At the
same time, the United States should warn
Ankara that a Turkish military incursion
into northeastern Syria to put down the
Kurdish autonomous zone would not be
tolerated by Washington and conceivably
might produce a military response. And
if the Assad government were to spurn
Kurdish autonomy talks and use force,
the United States should signal that such
action would prompt a military response.
n A new Geneva process should be
developed to bring all parties to
the negotiating table and ensure
“amnesty for amnesty” as a first step
in the process of bringing millions
of Syrian refugees back to their
homes. As difficult as it would be
for members of the Syrian opposition
and the international community,
this must entail amnesty for Syrian
government, military, and militia
officials who have been accused
of war crimes. In return, Syrian
refugees, including rebel fighters,
should be able to return without
fear of imprisonment, torture and
execution. In many past civil wars,
retribution by the winning side
against the losing side has been a
feature of the end of conflict. For
example, after Franco’s forces won the
Spanish Civil War in 1939, there were
at least 20,000 executions of loyalists
from the Republican side, and many
thousands more died in prisons and
labor camps in subsequent years.80
For Syrian refugees to come home,

80 Jason Webster, “Franco’s bloody finale,” Spectator, March 19, 2016. https://www.spectator.co.uk/2016/03/
francos-bloody-finale/
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they must be assured that no such
retribution occurs, but realistically
this can only come about if Syrian
regime officials themselves are
assured that they will not be brought
before the International Criminal
Court. Such an agreement could
be an area where the United States,
Russia, and the EU can cooperate.
n If an “amnesty for amnesty”
policy is applied, the international
community can then assemble a
donors’ conference to raise funds to
rebuild the country and facilitate the
return Syrian refugees. It is likely that
most Syrian refugees in Turkey, Jordan
and Lebanon would want to return
home after having lived for several
years under very difficult conditions,
but many of those who have been
granted asylum in Europe would
probably may want to stay there. Still,
the United States and the European
countries should encourage those
in Europe to return home if political
and economic conditions in Syria
improve. As mentioned earlier, the
refugee crisis has spurred a number
of problems in Europe, including the
growth of right-wing anti-immigrant
movements. A reduction of Syrian
refugees in Europe could mitigate this
problem. However, those refugees
who decide to stay in Europe should
be not be penalized and be protected
by European governments. Instead of
talking about European culture being
adversely affected by refugees from
Muslim nations, U.S. officials should
encourage European governments to
embrace inclusiveness.
n It is unrealistic for U.S. officials
to demand that Iran and Iranian
proxy forces, like the Shia militias,
leave Syria in the short-term. As
mentioned earlier, Iran is heavily
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invested in Syria and its relations
with the Assad regime are strategic.
For reasons of national pride, Iran
is not going to leave even under
onerous, new sanctions. However,
over the long-term, a gradual
withdrawal of foreign forces from
Syria is possible. If an “amnesty for
amnesty” policy is implemented and
refugees are allowed to return home
without retribution, a mechanism
could be put in place whereby
foreign military forces—including
those from Iran, Iran-supported Shia
militias including Hezbollah, Turkey,
France, and the United States—are
reduced in stages and according to
an agreed-upon timetable.
n The Russian military presence may
be more difficult to solve. Russia
has certainly increased its military
presence in Syria since it intervened
in September 2015, but its naval base
in Tartous predates the conflict and
goes back to the Soviet era. Moreover,
Assad may believe that the Soviet
military presence in Syria gives him
protection against an Israeli attack
even though the Russians have not
blocked any Israeli air strikes. It
thus may be unrealistic to assume
that the Russians would adhere to a
withdrawal of all of their forces from
Syria, but if there were indeed real
movement by the other parties to
the conflict to reduce their military
contingents, the Russians might
confine their military presence to the
naval base in Tartous and the air base
near Latakia.
One prominent think tank in Washington,
DC has proposed “international recognition
of de facto zones of control” of three zones
in Syria for the time being, in other words,
a regime zone for most of the country, a
Turkish zone in the northwest, and a U.S.STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
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supported Kurdish zone in the northeast.81
While that is the reality on the ground at
this juncture (August 2018), giving such
zones a kind of international legitimacy
could cause more problems down the road
for Syria.
n First, acknowledging Turkish
control of northwestern Syria, even
temporary, could feed into Turkish
President Erdogan’s Ottoman-type
foreign and security policy, which
is controversial and inimical to the
national interests of Syria and several
other Arab states. Although Turkey
has established military bases in
Qatar and Sudan in recent years
with the consent of these countries,
there is suspicion of Turkey’s
motives in other parts of the Arab
world, particularly as Erdogan has
supported the Muslim Brotherhood
in various countries and, for several
years, even allowed jihadist elements
from Europe to cross the TurkishSyrian border to join ISIS. Secularists
and nationalists within Syria, even
those not supportive of the Assad
government, would resent a Turkish
zone of influence in Idlib province,
and that would feed conspiracy
theories of Western powers, in
cahoots with Turkey, wishing to take
away Arab lands. Moreover, Syria
has never acknowledged Turkey’s
incorporation of the Alexandretta/
Hatay province that was given to
Ankara in 1939 by the French who
were then Syria’s colonial masters.
To acquiesce to Turkey’s control of
territory (Idlib province) adjacent to
this area would merely add another
irritant to Syrian Arab nationalist
feelings.

n Second, while the United States has
justified its presence in northeastern
Syria as part of the AUMF of 2001 and
the war on terror, its troops are not
there with the consent of the Syrian
government. Giving some type of
international legitimacy to a U.S.supported zone in northeastern Syria
could create the impression that the
United States was going to stay in
Syria indefinitely, further stoking
Arab fears that Washington seeks
to carve up the region. It was not
too long ago that similar sentiments
appeared in Iraq after the U.S.-led
invasion of 2003.
Sometimes, silence is better than
articulation, because the latter can lead to
different interpretations that may not be
in a country’s interests. Giving a stamp
of international legitimacy to current
divisions within a country like Syria is
likely to cause more problems than are
currently evident and may hurt efforts at
stabilization efforts as well as the proposal
of “amnesty for amnesty” outlined earlier.

Recommendations
for the U.S. Army

G

IV EN that much of the U.S.
military presence in northeastern
Syria consists of Army Special
Forces, the Army has both a professional
and moral duty to continue to assist the
Syrian Democratic Forces in routing the
last vestiges of ISIS in Syria, particularly
along the Syrian-Iraqi border. To leave
Syria before this mission is completed
would be perilous on several levels.
n First, even though ISIS is on its last
legs in Syria and Iraq, it could regroup

81 Brian Katulis, Peter Juul, and Daniel Benaim, “Seizing the Diplomatic Initiative in Syria,” Center for American
Progress, July 19, 2018, p. 3. https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2018/07/19/453742/seizingdiplomatic-initiative-syria/
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and take advantage of discontent
among Sunni Arabs in eastern Syria
and western Iraq. Although many
of these people deeply resented
ISIS rule, particularly its draconian
interpretation of Islam and its reign
of terror, if their plight does not
improve they might support ISIS or
another extremist group once again.
n Second, the U.S. Army should
encourage Arab tribesmen within the
SDF to recruit more ethnic Arabs into
this military organization. Having
Arabs provide their own security
in eastern Syria below the Kurdishpopulated region would lessen ethnic
tensions and augment stability. Such
a policy would also serve as a hedge
against another ISIS-like group.
Moreover, having a population trust
local military commanders will
likely yield better intelligence on
extremists attempting to re-infiltrate
the area.
n Third, failure to completely defeat
of ISIS would fuel its propaganda
efforts. That ISIS leader Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi is still alive and issuing
messages to his followers keeps
the ISIS “brand” still in play. Such
messages can still inspire so-called
“lone wolves” in Europe and the
United States to undertake terrorist
attacks even by rudimentary means.
By contrast, a complete defeat of
ISIS in Syria and Iraq may give such
followers in the West pause that the
so-called caliphate that Abu Bakr alBaghdadi created and championed
did not bring about a new era of
“justice” that he promised but merely
wound up wasting thousands of lives.
n Fourth, the U.S. Army, having
worked closely with the Syrian Kurds
in combating ISIS, should not leave
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the area prematurely, as that would
put these partners in jeopardy. Only
when iron-clad assurances are given
that neither the Syrian government
nor Turkey are going to put down the
Democratic Federation of Northern
Syria should U.S. Army begin to
leave the area as part of a withdrawal
of all foreign forces from Syria. As
a hedge against a reneging of such
promises, a U.S. Army liaison office
to the Democratic Federation of
Northern Syria, similar to what has
been established in the Kurdish
Regional Government in Iraq,
should be established as a symbol of
U.S. resolve. Although the decision
on whether the U.S. Army should
remain in northeastern Syria for a
period of time will be made by the
President, the Army’s input will be
important in the policy process. One
of the more effective arguments that
can be made is that if the United
States wants to continue to rely on
local partners in the Middle East
and around the world for counterterrorism operations, it must not
be seen abandoning these partners
to an uncertain fate once the job is
completed. Otherwise, obtaining
help from local forces becomes all
the more difficult.
n Fifth, U.S. Army commanders
on the ground in Syria should
avoid getting into public spats with
Turkish or Syrian political leaders.
While it was entirely understandable
for a U.S. commander to defend
his Kurdish partners against overt
threats from the Turkish president,
a media war can backfire, causing
political leaders to dig in their heels
and become even more obstinate.
That the political wing of the
Democratic Federation of Northern
Syria has been in negotiations with
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the Syrian government without
U.S. Army involvement is a positive
development, as it shows that Syrians
are trying to resolve disputes by
themselves. Granted, the U.S. military
presence in northeastern Syria
gives these Kurdish interlocutors
more resolution to press their case,
knowing that a Syrian military
incursion into their autonomous area
would have to contend with a wellarmed and well-trained contingent
of U.S. Army Special Forces but, as
mentioned earlier, some things are
best left unsaid.
n On the potential for a major
Israeli-Iranian clash in Syria,
U.S. Army officers, with direction
and supervision from Pentagon
authorities, should try to convince
their Israeli counterparts that a
war with Iran might be even more
destabilizing than the current
situation. Despite Tehran’s bravado,
Iranian forces and those of their
proxies in Syria are still no match
for the Israelis. Although these
forces have occasionally targeted
Israeli positions in the Golan
Heights,82 they have proven to be
more of a nuisance than anything
else. Moreover, an Israeli-Iranian
war inside Syria may work to put off
a settlement of the Syrian crisis and
set back recent efforts by the Syrian
government to take back areas near
the Golan that had been under
ISIS’s control. Having the Syrian
government, as opposed to ISIS, in
this region adjacent to the Golan is
in Israel’s interest.

n Over the short term U.S. Army
officers, again under the direction
of the Pentagon, can assure their
Israeli counterparts that as long as
the United States has a presence
in northeastern Syria, they will
ensure that Iranian and Iranian
proxy forces will not be able to use
that area to reinforce allied militias
in other parts of Syria, especially in
the event of an Israeli-Iranian war in
Syria. That said, U.S. Army officers
should try to avoid any discussions
with the Israelis about moving U.S.
troops outside from northeastern
Syria to other parts of the country,
as that might encourage the Israelis
to be more aggressive inside of Syria.
Although Israel certainly has a right
to defend itself in the face of real
threats, U.S. Army officers should
not encourage them to engage in
conflict, as a minor war with Iranian
and Iranian proxy forces in Syria
could quickly spiral into a larger
regional war whose outcome might
not be in the U.S. national security
interest.

82 Loveday Morris, “Iran fires rockets at Israeli military in first direct attack ever, Israel says,” The Washington Post,
May 9, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iranian-forces-fire-rockets-at-israeli-military-in-first-directattack-ever-israeli-army-says/2018/05/09/62e3a526-52f7-11e8-a6d4-ca1d035642ce_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_
term=.1f79488804a2
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